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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050458-CA

v,
PAUL IRONHORSE NEWKIRK,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
burglary, a third degree felony, and theft, a class A misdemeanor
(R. 86-87).

This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Can defendant prevail on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim where the evidence that he committed burglary and
theft was so strong as to preclude any finding of prejudice?
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of

the underlying trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, OT

16-17, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), governing burglary,
provides in relevant part:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit:
(b) theft.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004), governing theft,
provides:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an amended information with one
count each of burglary, a third degree felony, and theft, a class
A misdemeanor (R. 7-8). A jury convicted him as charged (R. 78).
The court sentenced defendant to zero-to-five years in the Utah
State Prison on the burglary charge and 365 days in jail on the
theft charge, to be served concurrently at the prison (R. 83-84).
After a hearing, the court ordered $1 in restitution (R. 106-07).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 80, 88).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In March of 2004, the owner of the Avon Apartments in Ogden
was using one of his vacant apartments to store some furniture,
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including an "enormously heavy" solid wood table "with a good
antique look to it" (R. 124: 51, 52). The table, consisting of a
tabletop and two base pieces that together formed a pedestal, had
been taken apart for storage purposes (Id. at 53, 61). 1
Late in the month, the apartment manager, Raymond Egner,
called the owner to say that he had found a responsible tenant
for the unit in which the table was stored (Id. at 55) .
Accordingly, the owner told Egner to move the heavy table into an
adjacent garage and suggested that he ask defendant to help (Id.
at 55, 70). 2 Defendant helped with the move, and Egner paid him
$10 (Id. at 70). Egner secured the garage door with a master
lock, and defendant went on his way (Id. at 76) .
The next day, while taking out the garbage, Egner noticed
the garage door ajar (Id. at 79). He went in and discovered that
the table was missing (Id.).

Outside, he saw an adjacent

property owner, Dave Worthen, building a fence and so walked over
to talk to him (Id. at 81) .
Worthen made his living restoring and renting property and
knew defendant from the neighborhood (Id. at 95-96).

He

1

The apartment owner testified that the table was so heavy
that "[o]ne man couldn't possibly [move] it" (R. 124: 53). The
manager described it as "[o]ne of the heaviest tables I've ever
moved" (Id^ at 72).
2

Both men knew defendant because he had lived
Apartments for about a month in exchange for helping
maintenance (Id. at 57, 65, 68). Although defendant
out by the time this case arose, he still spent time
neighborhood (Id. at 69-70).
3

at the Avon
out with
had moved
in the

testified that one day in March, he was outside working on a
fence, when he saw defendant at a distance of about 25 or 30 feet
(Id. at 101). Worthen testified:
I was just building that fence and I just
remember just seeing him there because I
remember he looked, he froze for a minute and
he was carrying something with him and he'd
taken a few steps and I walked up from in
between the houses and came out and he just
froze and looked at me like a deer in the
headlights, you know, just kind of, oh man.
And I kind of just remember that. That part
stuck in my head and I thought, what's going
on, you know.
Id. at 99.

Worthen testified that when he and defendant made eye

contact and defendant froze, "it made me feel like that guy is up
to no good" (Id. at 104) .

Worthen also testified that he saw the

table top "leaning up against the shed," which made him wonder,
"what's that table doing all the way over here?" (Id. at 103).
When Worthen saw defendant, he was carrying something with both
hands, which Worthen testified "looked to me . . . like a table
leg or something" (Id. at 102). He clarified, "It was part of
the table.

It was all torn apart it looked like.

It was obvious

that it was part of the table" (Id. at 104). Worthen said
nothing to defendant, noting "I normally don't get into other
people's business" (Id.).
Returning to his fence-building, Worthen moved towards the
front of his property to work on a section near the street (Id.
at 105). A few minutes later, he saw a small SUV emerge from a
driveway serving only a vacant building.

4

He observed, "This

place was vacant so I knew that no one, you know, no one should
even have been over in there on that'property" (Id. at 106).
Worthen testified that the vehicle drove "right in front of me"
with "the table hanging out from the rear of it, it was hanging
out quite a ways" (Id. at 105). Worthen observed someone other
than defendant driving the vehicle and did not see defendant
again that day (Id. at 106).
The next day while Worthen was working on his fence, Egner
approached him, agitated about the missing table (Id. at 108).
Worthen told him what he had seen, and Egner called the police
(Id. at 81, 108).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his counsel performed deficiently by
eliciting testimony about prior bad acts and then referencing his
bad character during closing.

He asserts prejudice because the

evidence against him was almost entirely circumstantial and the
improper testimony could only have inflamed the jury against him.
See Br. of Aplt. at 10-13, 15.
Defendant's argument fails.

His counsel elicited both

statements about prior acts on cross-examination in order to
dispel inferences raised on direct that defendant had been
involved in drug trafficking and the sale of stolen merchandise.
That counsel's legitimate trial strategy did not produce the
anticipated result does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Similarly, counsel's statements to the jury in closing

5

does not amount to deficient performance but rather constitutes a
rational strategy intended to diminish the import of defendant's
past by candidly acknowledging it had been less than perfect.
Moreover, defendant has failed to establish any prejudice.
He argues that because the evidence against him was
circumstantial, the inflammatory nature of his prior bad conduct
was enough to turn the jury's verdict against him.
Circumstantial evidence, however, is not an inferior form of
evidence, as defendant suggests.

When, as here, the overwhelming

circumstantial evidence and the many reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from it establish every element of theft and
burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's claim fails.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIM ULTIMATELY FAILS
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE THAT HE
COMMITTED BURGLARY AND THEFT IS SO
STRONG AS TO PRECLUDE ANY FINDING
OF PREJUDICE
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.

He contends that his counsel performed

deficiently by improperly eliciting evidence about prior bad acts
from two witnesses and then referencing his bad character during
closing argument.

See Br. of Aplt. at 10-12.

He also asserts

that this evidence was "highly prejudicial" because the case "was
based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence" and the
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improperly adduced evidence "could have only served to inflame
the jury and show that he has a bad character."

Id. at 13, 15.3

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah
1990) .
When reviewing trial counsel's work to assess deficient
performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance."

State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d

681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)).

"If a rational basis for

counsel's performance can be articulated, [this Court] will
assume counsel acted competently."
461, 468 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d

Thus, "an ineffective assistance

claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions."

3

Id.

Defendant also briefly references the possibility of
plain error by the trial court. See Br. of Aplt. at 16-17.
Noting that defense counsel himself elicited the allegedly
damaging testimony, however, he properly concludes that the
invited error doctrine precludes the applicability of a plain
error analysis. See id. at 17.
7

Defendant first complains that his counsel performed
deficiently by raising the issue of defendant's involvement with
drugs by asking Egner, the apartment manager, if he had seen
anything indicative of illegal drugs in defendant's apartment.
See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11.

Contrary to defendant's assertion,

however, defense counsel raised the issue only after

the owner of

the apartment complex had testified on direct that a building on
his corner was rife with drug-related traffic, which had caused
several of his tenants to move, and that defendant was evicted
because of excessive traffic between his apartment and the
building on the corner.

See R. 50, 58.

A reasonable inference

from this testimony was that defendant was also involved in drug
trafficking.

Under such circumstances, defense counsel made a

strategic choice to pursue the issue, in an attempt to
disassociate his client from the neighborhood drug activity.

The

law is well-settled that "[a] lawyerfs legitimate exercise of
judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does not produce
the anticipated result does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel."

State v. Wvnia, 754 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah App.

1988)(citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983);
State v, McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1976)).
Defendant also complains that his counsel performed
deficiently by referencing his "questionable character" in
closing argument.

See Br. of Aplt. at 12-13.

Defense counsel's

comments, however, could well have been part of a trial strategy
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to diminish the import of defendant's past by candidly
acknowledging that defendant had a "tough life" and had made some
"bad choices" (R. 124: 140). Because these comments also fall
within a legitimate trial strategy, they do not constitute
objectively deficient performance.

Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468.

Another question of deficient performance is presented by
defense counsel's choice to probe earlier testimony from the
neighbor, Dave Worthen, that he knew defendant from the
neighborhood and that occasionally defendant had offered to sell
him various items.

See R. 124: 97-98.

Worthen had testified

that defendant tried to sell him a light fixture that defendant
said was surplus from the apartment complex as well as a carpet
shampooer that defendant said had been replaced by a new one
(Id.).

Defense counsel, reasonably surmising that this testimony

raised an inference that defendant was selling stolen
merchandise, sought to dispel that inference by asking Worthen if
anyone had told him the items were stolen (Id. at 113). While
the inference of wrong-doing in the original witness response may
be somewhat weaker than in the exchange referencing drug
trafficking, counsel's attempt to dispel it nonetheless
constituted a legitimate trial strategy for minimizing its
importance.4

That the strategy produced an unexpected result

4

When this strategic choice did not play out as defense
counsel anticipated, he sought to mitigate any potential damage
by noting in closing argument, "People do what they have to do to
survive sometimes. It doesn't make it right but it has nothing
to do with this case" (R. 124: 142).
9

does not negate its valid strategic purpose.

See Wynia, 754 P.2d

at 672 (citations omitted).
Even assuming, arguendo, that defense counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
when he elicited further testimony about the carpet shampooer,
the dispositive issue remains whether, without the error,
defendant would have enjoyed a reasonable likelihood of a better
trial outcome.

See, e.g., Templin, 805 P.2d at 187.

Here, the

crux of defendant's argument seems to be that because the
evidence against him was circumstantial, the inflammatory nature
of his prior bad conduct was enough to tip the jury's verdict
against him.

See Br. of Aplt. at 15-16.5

Without the improper

evidence, he asserts, the outcome of his trial would likely have
been more favorable.

See id. at 8.

A reviewing court determines whether deficient performance
results in prejudice by considering "the totality of the evidence
[and] taking into account such factors as whether the errors
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187.
In this case, Worthen testified on direct that defendant had
approached him about buying a carpet shampooer.

5

Then, on cross,

Defendant makes no distinction between the prior conduct
involving selling stolen merchandise and his involvement in drug
trafficking. Defendant merely argues generally that each
instance of counsel's conduct was equally prejudicial. See Br.
of Aplt. at 16.
10

defense counsel elicited testimony that the police later had also
approached him, inquiring about a stolen carpet shampooer.
Because defendant was on trial for theft, the testimony implying
that defendant had been involved in a previous theft plainly did
not help his case.
stop here.

See id.

The inquiry into prejudice, however, does not
The reviewing court must also examine "how

strongly the verdict is supported by the record."

Id.

Defendant's argument fails because he mistakenly relies on
circumstantial evidence as an inherently less compelling form of
evidence that more easily gives rise to prejudice.

He fails to

appreciate not only the strength of the evidence against him but
also this Court's role in assessing that evidence:
When, as here, the evidence consists solely
of undisputed, circumstantial evidence, the
role of the reviewing court is to determine
(1) whether there is any evidence that
supports each and every element of the crime
charged, and (2) whether the inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence have a basis
in logic and reasonable human experience
sufficient to prove each legal element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty
verdict is not legally valid if it is based
solely on inferences that give rise to only
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993); accord State v.
Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998).
Here, defendant was convicted of burglary and theft for
unlawfully entering a building and intentionally taking a table,
without authority, that he knew did not belong to him.
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202, 76-6-404.
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See Utah

Applying the first prong of the

Workman test, the evidence supporting the elements of burglary
and theft was substantial.

The owner testified that he and the

manager, Flay Egner, were the only two people authorized to enter
the storage shed (R. 124: 57).

Defendant helped Egner move the

table, in three large pieces, from the apartment to the shed (Id.
at 69, 72). Egner then locked the garage with a master lock to
which only he had a key (Id. at 76-77).

The next day, Egner

noticed the door was ajar, the lock was gone, and the table was
missing (Id. at 80, 90). An adjacent property owner, Dave
Worthen, told Egner that he had seen defendant on the previous
day carrying a large table leg in both arms away from the garage
(Id. at 102, 104). Worthen also said that when he and defendant
made eye contact, defendant froze "like a deer in the
headlights," causing Worthen to "feel like [defendant was] up to
no good" (Id. at 99). Worthen also noticed the table top
outside, leaning up against a garage, and wondered why it was
there (Id. at 103).

Just a few minutes later, he observed a

small SUV driven by someone other than defendant drive by him
with the table hanging out from the rear (Id. at 105-06).

The

vehicle had emerged from a driveway that accessed only a vacant
building (Id. at 116). Egner did not see defendant in the
neighborhood after the vehicle drove by (Id. at 106).

This

evidence plainly supports all the elements of burglary and theft.
Applying the second prong of the Workman test, the
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence are so logical as
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
crimes.

First, defendant knew that the table was in the shed and

that the shed was secured by a single master lock.

Second, it is

reasonable to infer that defendant cut off the lock to get into
the shed.

Third, Worthen's testimony that defendant froze "like

a deer in the headlights" when Worthen saw him carrying the table
leg gives rise to the reasonable inference that defendant froze
because he had been "caught" by Worthen in the act of stealing
the table and that his "freezing" and his "deer in the
headlights" look arose, as Worthen suspected, precisely because
he was engaged in unlawful activity.

Fourth, testimony that the

table top was too heavy for one person to move and that an
unidentified person was driving the SUV gives rise to an
inference that this person was also involved in the commission of
the crimes and that he helped defendant remove the heavy table
top from the garage and load it into the vehicle.

Fifth,

Worthen's testimony that he did not see defendant after the SUV
drove by gives rise to the inference that defendant left in the
vehicle with the driver.
The strong circumstantial evidence in this case, combined
with the logical inferences rooted in human experience, support
defendant's convictions for burglary and theft.

This is not a

case giving rise to only a "remote or speculative possibilit[y]
cf guilt."

Workman, 852 P.2d at 985.

In this case, the State

has proven defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Thus, even assuming arguendo that counsel performed
deficiently when he elicited testimony that defendant had tried
to sell a stolen carpet shampooer, defendant suffered no
prejudice as a result.

Even without the damaging testimony, he

enjoyed no better prospect of a more favorable outcome to his
trial.

Consequently, his ineffective assistance claim fails.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count each of burglary and theft.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _4__
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of

February, 2006.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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